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Abstract 
 
In slightly more than 30 years Dallas-based Southwest Airlines has grown into the 
fourth largest airline in the USA and the entire world. With its innovative low-cost low-
fare no-frills business formula it has indeed revolutionized air travel. What is more the 
airline has become the most consistently profitable airline ever as well as the safest 
operator on the domestic US market. In this paper we will first discuss in much detail 
Southwest’s business model  as opposed to the traditional network carriers’ approach. 
Then we will demonstrate that the unprecendented rise of Southwest Airlines – which 
has spawned an ever increasing number of epigones – reveals that the true effectiveness 
of strategic barriers to entry into the airline industry such as loyalty programs, computer 
reservations systems etc. has long been overestimated by economists, airline 
professionals, and policymakers alike. On the contrary, we show that infrastructure 
bottlenecks – which, in turn, are overwhelmingly caused or at least amplified by ill-
designed allocation rules and access regulations – must be considered the only effective 
protection for inefficient incumbents. 
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Successful Entry Strategies on the Deregulated US Domestic Market 
– the Case of Southwest Airlines 
 
Andreas Knorr and Andreas Arndt∗ 
 
 
                                                
Introduction 
 
Founded in 1967 in Dallas, Texas, but – its application for an operating licence being 
the object of a protracted legal dispute initiated by local incumbents Braniff, Trans 
Texas (later to become Texas International), and Continental – unable to enter revenue 
service until June 14, 1971, Southwest Airlines (SWA) has not only grown, in terms of 
revenue passengers enplaned, into the fourth largest airlines in the USA and, at that, of 
the entire planet by 2001. While most other start-ups on the deregulated US market 
failed to survive even their first few years in the business, SWA’s revolutionary formula 
– low-cost, low-fare, no-frills, high-frequency, short-haul, point-to-point-service instead 
of the established airlines‘ traditional high-cost, high-fare, full-service, hub-and-spoke 
operation – also turned the company into the most consistently profitable airline ever. It 
comes as no surprise then that SWA has become a sort of role model for the growing 
number of low-cost carriers shaking up the industry around the globe: Ryanair, easyJet 
and GO in Europe,1 Germania in Germany, AirTran (formerly known as ValuJet) and 
JetBlue in the USA, Westjet in Canada, and VirginBlue in Australia, to name just a few. 
Despite their momentary spectacular growth rates and profits, the final jury on the long-
term viability of this so-called second wave of low-cost outfits – all first-wavers except 
for SWA, e.g. PeoplExpress and Air Florida, folded quickly2 – is still out. Also, all the 
low-cost subsidiaries and brands created by the big US carriers in reaction to SWA’s 
and its clones‘ expansion have, in spite of their parents’ financial muscle, either gone 
under or are being massively scaled down in the aftermath of 9/11.3 
The very mixed fortunes of its emulators prove, therefore, that adopting a SWA-style 
business model per se is no guarantee for long-term success. And while it is true that 
passengers on the domestic US market as a whole have enjoyed significant benefits 
since, and because of, deregulation – according to a study by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation essentially the result of a development it named the “low cost airline ser-
vice revolution“4 – in some key markets significant barriers to entry do persist.5 They 
continue to shield incumbents effectively from low-fare competitors including, in some 
cases, SWA. What is more, even SWA, which in 2000 accounted for roundabout ninety 
 
∗  University of Bremen, Faculty 7: Business Studies and Economics, Institute for World Econo-
mics and International Management, P.O. Box 33 04 40, 28334 Bremen, Germany, Phone: +49-
421-2182259 (Knorr), +49-421-2182458 (Arndt); Fax: +49-421-2184550; E-mail: aknorr@uni-
bremen.de (Knorr), aarndt@uni-bremen.de (Arndt).  
1  In May 2002, easyJet announced its takeover of GO. 
2  For a detailed analysis see Gudmundsson (1998). 
3  For details see Woodyard (2001). 
4  See United States Department of Transportation (1996). 
5  See United States General Accounting Office (1996). 
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(!) percent of all low-fare airline service in the USA,6 almost failed to take wing in its 
start-up period, only narrowly escaping bankruptcy after competitors practiced price and 
non-price predation against it. The lessons from SWA’s rise, most of them challenging 
conventional (and scholarly) wisdom about the appropriate corporate strategy in a dere-
gulated business environment, therefore offer invaluable insights into the nature of com-
petition in the airline industry. In particular, they will help policy-makers and econo-
mists to make progress in identifying hard-core post-deregulation barriers to entry, in 
better assessing their anticompetitive impact and, hopefully, in substantially lowering 
them for the benefit of the flying public and society as a whole.  
 
SWA: A Company Profile 
The Track Record: Key Corporate Data 1971-2001 
The data in table 1 reflects SWA’s spectacular corporate growth from the tiny 4-aircraft 
airline it was in 1971 into one of the largest carriers on the US domestic market, as well 
as worldwide. 
Table 1: Basic SWA Facts and Figures  
 1971 2000 2001 
Size of fleet 4 344 355 
Number of employees 
(full-time equivalent) 
195 29,274 31,580 
Number of revenue passengers 108,554 63,678,261 64,446,773 
Number of cities/airports 
(states) served 
3 (1) 58 (29) 59 (30) 
Total operating revenues $ 2.13 mio $ 5.65 bn $ 5.55 bn 
Net income (loss)  ($ 3.8 mio) $ 625.2 mio $ 511.1 mio 
Market share (as percentage of  
Domestic revenue passengers 
carried) 
≈0 % 10,1 % n/a yet 
Market share (as percentage of 
domestic revenue passenger 
miles) 
≈0 % 6,1 % n/a yet 
Sources: Freiberg/Freiberg (1996, p. 326); SWA (2001, 2002a, 2002b);  
    Air Transport Association (2002a). 
 
An even more impressive picture emerges when some more detailed company-specific 
information is added: 
 Including 2001, SWA has posted annual profits every single year since 1973, i.e. for 
29 consecutive years. What is more, profits have increased, in absolute terms, every 
year between 1992 and 2000, i.e. for nine years in a row.7 
                                                 
6  See Southwest Airlines (2001: 4). 
7  See Southwest Airlines (2001: 4). 
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 In the fourth quarter of 2001, SWA announced its 102nd consecutive quarterly divi-
dend,8 a “record of consistency unmatched in an industry better known for its wild 
lurches from feast to famine“.9 
 In 2000, it accomplished an operating margin of 18.1 per cent, and a net margin of 
11.1 per cent, by far the best figures of any major USA airline and second in the 
world only to Ryanair, an Irish SWA-clone operating successfully in Europe.10 Even 
in the extremely difficult economic climate in 2001, it managed to achieve margins 
of 11 per cent and 9.1 per cent, respectively.11 
 SWA’s current net debt/total capital ratio of 33 percent (excluding operating leases 
for aircraft and ground facilitites) is the lowest in the US industry (American: 59 per 
cent; Delta: 59 per cent; United: 69 per cent; Continental: 88 per cent; USAirways: 
92 per cent; Northwest: 96 per cent; AirTran, the second largest low cost operator 
on the US market: 98 per cent).12 
 Standard & Poor upgraded SWA’s credit rating for senior unsecured fixed-rate debt 
from A¯ to A in 2000, again by far the best rating for any US airline (SWA is rated 
A¯ or equivalent by the two other major US rating agencies, Moody’s and Fitch).13 
 At 7.19 cents/ASM14 SWA boasts the lowest operating costs of all major US car-
riers, outperforming the competition by a margin of 20 to 40 per cent.15 
 With a market valuation of 14.9 bn $ (figure for December 2001) SWA is worth 
more than its six largest US competitors – American (having recently taken over 
TWA), Delta, United, Northwest, and USAirways – combined.16 
 Never in its corporate history, not even in the crises years 1979 (second oil price 
shock), 1982/83 (US recession), 1991/92 (Gulf War) and 2001 (9/11), each event 
forcing massive industry-wide lay-offs, has SWA had to furlough any staff. By 
comparison, in 2001, the major US airlines dismissed a total of 80,300 employees, 
out of the industry’s total of 567,800 employees on 9/11 (the latter figure includes 
SWA’s roundabout 31,000 staff!).17 And while the competition has not yet announ-
ced any new hirings for the time being, SWA has announced that it will add roughly 
                                                 
8  See Southwest Airlines (2002c). 
9  Done (2001: VII). 
10  See Southwest Airlines (2001: 1 and 7). – Ryanair achieved a net margin of 21.4 per cent in 
2001. See Ryanair (2001: 2). 
11  Own calculations based upon Southwest Airlines (2002a). 
12  See Cameron (2001: 17). – If all operating leases were included the ratio would rise to slightly 
less than sixty per cent, still by far the best figure in the US airline industry. 
13  See Southwest Airlines (2001: 17 and 24).  
14  See Southwest Airlines (2002b). 
15  See Doganis (2001: 131). – If adjusted for SWA’s significantly much lower average trip length 
compared to the competition‘s, its cost advantage per ASM is even greater. 
16  See Done (2001: VII). 
17  See Freiberg/Freiberg (1996, p. 7); Air Transport Association (2002b: 6). – In its start-up phase 
in the early 1970ies, a brief cash shortage forced SWA to temporarily lay off 3 (three) staff who 
were rehired soon. 
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4,000 employees to its workforce in 2002, among them around 250 pilots and 1,200 
cabin crew.18 
 Aside from paying at least market wages, SWA was the first airline to introduce a 
profitsharing plan for its employees as early as 1974.19 
 Setting another industry record, around 81 per cent of SWA’s staff are unionized.20 
 According to U.S. Department of Transportation statistics (the Air Travel Consumer 
Report) SWA has had the lowest number of complaint per 100,000 passengers car-
ried in the last ten consecutive years.21 Moreover, setting another unprecedented all-
time industry record, it came out, between 1992 and 1996, the best US carrier in all 
three quality of service categories then surveyed by the agency (and has still been  
ranking high ever since).22  
 Finally, defying widespread public fears that low fares may come at the cost of 
flight safety, SWA boasts, alongside America West, another post-deregulation start-
up, with only one hull-loss and no fatalities on record so far, by a wide margin the 
best safety record of all US airlines and one of the best safety statistics worldwide 
(see tables 2 and 3).23 
Table 2: Casualties x 1000/Mio. Revenue Passenger Kilometers (1973-2001) 
Southwest Airlines 0.00 
America West 0.00 
Continental Airlines 0.03 
Delta Air Lines 0.09 
Northwest Airlines 0.09 
United Airlines 0.09 
US Airways 0.10 
American Airlines 0.30 
TWA 0.32 
Source: Richter/Wolf (2002). 
 
                                                 
18  See Flug Revue (2002: 25). – It will also be the first US airline to eventually take delivery of 
most of the aircraft the delivery of which it had decided to postpone after 9/11. See Lewis   
(2002: 7). 
19  See Southwest Airlines (2002b). – Employees currently own around 10 per cent of SWA’s stock. 
20  Ibd. 
21  See Southwest Airlines (1997: 16).  
22  The three categories then were: mishandled baggage, on-time performance, and overall customer 
satisfaction as measured by the number of complaints per 100,000 passengers carried. Recently, 
a fourth category – oversales (i.e. overbookings) – has been added. 
23  See Richter/Wolf (2002: 86f). 
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Table 3: Number of Total Hull Losses (1973-2001) 
Southwest Airlines 1 
America West 1 
Northwest Airlines 3 
Delta Air Lines 5 
USAirways 8 
United Airlines 8 
Continental 8 
TWA 10 
American Airlines 11 
Source: Richter/Wolf (2002). 
 
SWA’s Business Model 
Obviously, SWA has managed to identify a sustainable competitive advantage its net-
work-based rivals have found impossible to imitate, and most of its low-cost epigones 
have been unable to preserve while expanding their operation. As mentioned above, 
analysts and academic researchers have long argued that SWA’s success is due to the 
carrier having identified a market niche neglected by the traditional network carriers – 
such as Delta, United, American, USAirways, Continental and Northwest – and stuck 
with it ever since: low-cost, low-fare, no-frills, high-frequency, short-haul, point-to-
point service between secondary or uncongested airports, primarily aimed at price-
sensitive (i.e. leisure) travellers. The network carriers’ product, by contrast, is usually 
described as high-cost, high-fare, full-service, medium- to long-haul, medium- to high-
frequency (mostly) connecting service via hubs, catering for the special needs of a 
price-insensitive business traveller clientèle.  
While this has always been an incomplete and hence somewhat misleading description 
of both SWA’s and the traditional carriers respective markets – SWA has always aimed 
strongly at the business travel segment, in particular by being the only low-cost carrier 
to offer high-frequency service,24 and most of the network carriers’ passenger are indeed 
price-sensitive leisure travellers – the gap between SWA’s and the network-based 
carriers‘ business models has narrowed over time. Examples:  
 Initially being the unrestricted low fares paragon with a simple peak off-peak fare 
structure, SWA reacted to the network carriers more and more sophisticated yield 
management techniques in 1986 by also introducing basic yield management,25 of-
fering ever since discounted restricted fares (significantly undercutting its own low 
unrestricted fares) with similar advance purchase and minimum stay requirements, 
too. Given SWA’s substantial cost advantage, no major carrier has been able to 
match these extremely low fares for any extended period of time, while SWA mana-
ged to improve and stabilize its profits in consequence. Still, however, SWA has 
                                                 
24  The same is true for most European low-cost carriers which, like easyJet and GO report a busin-
ess traveller share of 60 and 40 per cent respectively. See The Economist (2001: 69); Rubython 
(2001: 25). – For recent empirical analyses on the ever increasing attractiveness of low-cost 
carriers for business travellers in the European context see Mason (2000 and 2001). 
25  See Petzinger (1995: 329f.) 
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stuck with a very simple fare structure in order to reduce transaction costs for both 
the company and its customers to a minimum. As a result, SWA has the lowest fare 
dispersion of all major US carriers.26 
 In 1987 SWA created a frequent-traveller bonus scheme of its own (Rapid Rewards, 
until 1996 known as Company Club). Being based upon the number of trips taken 
instead of the mileage accumulated, it is widely perceived to be the least restrictive 
and most generous loyalty programme of all US airlines. 
 After taking delivery of its first Boeing 737-700 aircraft, the only 737-variant offer-
ing transcontinental range, SWA has begun entering selected long-haul markets, 
such as Providence (Rhodes Island) – Phoenix (at 2.271 miles the longest SWA 
route so far), with low-frequency service (usually 2 or 3 round trips per day). This 
move has pushed the company’s average passenger trip length up to 690 miles (from 
563 miles in 1997) and the average aircraft trip length to 514 miles, or 1 hour 33 mi-
nutes (from 425 miles in 1997).27  
 Between 20 and 30 per cent of SWA’s customers are through passengers on one- or 
multi-stop services or are on-line connecting (flow) traffic at its primary airports.28  
 Four of the network carriers, in turn, set up their own low cost divisions – United’s 
Shuttle by United, USAir’s MetroJet, Continental’s Continental Lite, and Delta’s 
Delta Express – to compete head-to-head with SWA. However, this so-called ‘air-
line within the airline’-model failed miserably. While denting SWA’s profits for just 
a couple of quarters,29 these operations virtually haemorrhaged their parent compa-
nies’ resources, so that they had to be discontinued or massively scaled down. 
 As part of a wider cost reduction plan to counter SWA’s cost advantage the network 
carriers also eliminated most inflight food service in their economy class cabins (tra-
ditionally, none of the big US carriers has ever offered free alcoholic beverages in 
economy class on domestic services). 
 Most of the specific amenities offered by network carriers, such as lounge access or 
preferred check-in facilities, are not generally available but restricted to the small 
minority of full-fare first- or business class ticketholders and to those passengers 
who have reached elite status in their frequent traveller programs.  
 
We will therefore argue in the following that SWA’s business model should be more 
broadly defined, including not only the standard features of the low-cost, low-fare mo-
del, which it put to perfection, but also its specific approach to labor relations, financial 
and strategic management.  
 
                                                 
26  The highest fares on SWA are about twice the median fare for all passengers. For the domestic 
services of all other US carriers, it is at least three time the median. See Transportation Research 
Board (1999: 1-10). 
27  See Southwest Airlines (1998: 18; 2001: F22f; 2002b). 
28  See Southwest Airlines (2001) 
29  See Southwest Airlines (1996, p. 5). 
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Excursus: Cost Advantages of Low-cost Airlines – the Traditional View 
According to conventional wisdom, low-cost airlines derive their cost advantage vis-à-
vis network carriers from three highly interdependent sources: lower input costs plus 
simplified, and hence less costly, product and process design.30 The most important in-
puts being staff (onboard, ground and administrative personnel), aircraft, aircraft main-
tenance and servicing, and airport facilities (gates, check-in counters, landing and park-
ing fees), savings may result form either of two sources: lower input prices or higher 
productivity. The former, then, may result from 
 lower nominal wages for all employee groups, 
 acquiring older, and hence less expensive, used aircraft, and 
 serving underutilized secondary or uncongested airports charging lower fees.31 
 
While this strategy has been pursued by most low-cost airlines, it has some serious pit-
falls. In particular, this cost advantage is only sustainable if a large pool of qualified 
personnel as well as plenty of idle second-hand aircraft are continually available – high-
ly unlikely in the notoriously volatile airline business. What is more, the supply of inex-
pensive, underused airport capacity may decrease as low-cost operators grow. Finally, 
while the sticker-price of second-hand aircraft may be lower, their direct operating costs 
– in particular because of their higher specific fuel consumption –  always exceed those 
of brand new equipment. 
Innovations in both product and process design therefore promise to be more sustainab-
le sources of cost competitiveness. Aside from offering point-to-point service, the low-
cost carriers’ ‘no-frills’ product design therefore aims at eliminating all product features 
the target groups of passengers do not typically demand (a welcome side-effect of this 
kind of streamlining being simplified, and hence more cost-effective, operating proces-
ses). Typically, the low-cost ‘no-frills’ product has the following features:32 
 One-class, high density seating; 
 no inflight food service apart from non-perishable snack items like peanuts (aside 
from allowing the airline to replace the galley sections of its planes with more seats, 
this also helps low-cost carriers to reduce turnaround times and cleaning costs; mo-
reover less cabin crew is required); 
 no advance seat assignment; 
 no frequent-flyer programs;  
 no frequent traveller lounges at airports; 
 no costly interlining agreement with other airlines; and 
                                                 
30  See, amongst others, Barkin/Hertzsell/Young (1995). 
31  With Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles – its 1st, 2nd and 8th most important markets – SWA 
does, however, serve the 9th, 7th, and 3rd busiest US-airports (in terms of passengers enplaned). 
On the other hand, SWA discontinued service to Denver Stapleton and, recently, to San Francis-
co International Airport – scaling up service to adjacent Oakland and San José instead −, after 
excessive delays at these fields continued to impact negatively on its operation. 
32  See Lawton (2000: 96). 
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 no participation in codesharing arrangements or other forms of airline alliances. 
 
Finally, significant cost savings may be realized through optimizing processes, primari-
ly in the two areas distribution as well as aircraft and airport operations. Practices to 
substantially lower distribution costs include 
 bypassing computer reservation systems (CRS) and travel agents through direct sell-
ing and telemarketing (using the internet and toll-free phone sales via reservation 
centers), thereby saving commissions and service fees; and 
 the introduction of paperless – electronic – ticketing. 
 
The key to reducing the costs of aircraft and airport operations is to achieve high 
average daily utilization rates of these assets, essentially through short turnaround times 
on the ground. Whereas the traditional network carriers have to schedule average turn-
around times of between 45 and 60 minutes in order to keep their hub-and-spoke-oper-
ations commercially viable – which are designed to improve load factors by maximizing 
the number of on-line connections offered –, low-cost carriers typically make do with a 
mere 20 to 30 minutes for their point-to-point service between secondary or unconge-
sted airports. This higher utilization, in turn, translates into one or two additional reven-
ue services per aircraft per day for low-cost airlines as compared to network carriers. 
 
The Specific Sources of SWA’s Lasting Competitiveness 
Of course, SWA has taken advantage of low input costs wherever possible and reason-
able. Most noteworthy in this respect, it has standardized its fleet around the Boeing 737 
aircraft, thus reaping enormous maintenance, training, staffing and scheduling-related 
cost savings. Moreover, SWA has been among the launch customers for three of the 
four 737-variants it is currently operating – the B737-300, B737-500, and B737-700 –, 
hence profiting not only from significant manufacturer’s discounts (launch customers’ 
rebates typically amount to around 30 per cent of the list price), but also from the very 
favorable economics associated with operating the youngest fleet of all major US airlin-
es.33 What is more, as stated above, SWA also manages to reduce infrastructure access 
costs by focussing on underutilized, uncongested or secondary airports.  
These permanent cost-saving efforts on the input side notwithstanding, SWA has prima-
rily relied throughout its history on the more sustainable strategy of becoming the indu-
stry’s cost leader by maximizing its overall productivity through clever product and pro-
cess design: 
 In part, these productivity-induced savings, too, result from the company’s one-
class, point-to-point service to/from secondary or uncongested airports,34 allowing it 
to achieve the industry’s quickest turnaround times – complemented by a mean 
                                                 
33  On average, SWA aircraft are only 8.75 years old. 33 older B737-200 are, at an average age of 
18.8 years, being phased out and will be replaced by state-of-the-art B737-700 aircraft. See 
Southwest Airlines (2001: 12; 2002b). 
34  Whenever SWA serves busier airports, including other carriers‘ hubs, it avoid scheduling its 
flight during peak periods, opting for the periods between connecting banks instead. See 
Transport Research Board (1999: 1-15). 
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ground taxi time for SWA aircraft of only 3 minutes 44 seconds35 –, translating, at 
an average of 11.18 hours per day,36 into the highest industrywide aircraft utilization 
rate. This not only maximizes fleet and air crew productivity.37 Both ground staff 
and ground infrastructure (gates, check-in facilities) can thus be utilized in the most 
efficient manner, too. 
 SWA has the major US airlines lowest distribution costs, not least because of it 
being the pioneer in the use of technology to automatize sales and ticketing. More 
than 70 per cent of all seats are sold directly by SWA – a marked contrast to the in-
dustry average of 20 to 25 per cent – through two different distribution channels: 
phone reservation centers and, increasingly, the internet. Having been the very first 
US airline to adopt online booking, SWA is currently earning around 40 per cent of 
its ticket revenues from internet sales,38 whereas its competitors only attain figures 
between 5 and 10 per cent.39 Ticketless travel (i.e. electronic instead of paper 
tickets), in 2000 being chosen by more than 80 per cent of SWA’s customers, was 
introduced systemwide on January 31, 1995, another industry first.40 And finally, as 
early as 1980, SWA was the first US airline to install automated ticket vending 
machines (ATVM) at its main airports with the aim to reduce the time passengers 
had to wait in line at ticket counters without having to increase the number of sales 
agents.41 
 
While the proceeding section gives a good description of SWA’s operation, some more 
information is necessary to get the full picture on why it has been unique – including the 
network carriers’ doomed airline-within-the airline low-cost outfits – in sustaining its 
competitive advantage while realizing impressive corporate growth. In our view, the 
SWA low-cost business model is special for being built on at least five more, and 
mutually reinforcing, cornerstones, its various competitors have failed to notice and/or 
imitate: a high quality of service, excellent labor relations, unconventional advertising 
and public relations, conservative corporate finance, and organic corporate growth.  
High Quality of Service 
Due to their point-to-point operation, low-cost carriers stand a good chance of offering 
better quality of service than their traditional network competitors in some, from the 
passengers’ perspective, crucial areas: on-time performance (their punctuality record is 
usually significantly better because there is no need to wait for delayed inbound con-
necting flights/passengers) and mishandled baggage (a small percentage of flow traffic 
inevitably decreases the risk of missing and misdirected baggage). In contrast to its 
epigones SWA has always been careful, however, to add another quality dimension to 
                                                 
35  See Southwest Airlines (2002b). 
36  See Southwest Airlines (2001: 12). 
37  Although SWA’s pilot earn market wages, they cost around 40 per cent less to employ per block 
hour than the major US airlines‘ average. See Barkin/Hertzell/Young (1995: 89). 
38  See Southwest Airlines (2002b). 
39  See Pappas (2001: 51). 
40  See Southwest Airlines (1996: 15;  2001: 15). 
41  See Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 139). 
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its low-fare product: the same high-frequency service as offered by its network com-
petitors in order to minimize overall travel time for all customers and to fully meet the 
specific needs of the short-haul business traveller.  
Excellent Labor Relations 
In an industry notoriously plagued by labor strife, SWA has been unique in having the 
highest degree of unionization while never having fallen victim to industrial action. For 
its no-furlough policy and non-hierarchial, extremely decentralized organization, by 
paying standard wages, by establishing the industry’s first profitsharing plan in 1974, 
through careful recruitment and comprehensive training, and, with one exception (see 
below), by pursuing a strict strategy of internal growth, SWA’s management has ob-
viously been much more successful than the competition in aligning the interests of all 
employee groups with the company’s, thus creating and preserving a strong corporate 
culture, the underdog ‘Southwest spirit’. With the unions’ consent, in turn, management 
has been able to implement many important productivity-enhancing, extraordinarily 
flexible operational processes throughout the entire organization. Visible signs for the 
excellent labor-management relationship include an unprecedented 10-year labor con-
tract between SWA and the Southwest Airlines’ Pilot Union (it was signed in 1995) and 
SWA’s having been repeatedly voted one of the most admired US companies as well as 
one of the best US companies to work for.42 
Unconventional Advertising and Public Relations 
SWA has always made virtuous use of advertising in general and the media in particular 
to cultivate its underdog image and to promote its brand and product. Initially,  SWA 
aggressively marketed itself as the ‘Love airline’: based at Dallas Love Field Airport, 
serving ‘Love potions’ and ‘Love bites’ (peanuts) on board, and hiring very attractive 
air hostesses only, it quickly managed to attract a large number of male business travel-
lers.43 Every addition to its route network was then advertised as spreading ‘love’ to the 
new destination. Even today, SWA’s ticker symbol on the New York Stock Exchange is 
LUV. While raising a frown or two today, it is doubtful whether SWA would have sur-
vived its tough start-up phase without the ‘Love’ image. Later, in the more politically 
correct times of the 1990ies, it partly redefined its image to become a ‘Symbol of Free-
dom’, successfully insinuating that it had helped, through its low fares, to democratize 
flying.  
Another example: In an effort to counteract decreasing service quality in the US airline 
industry, the United States Department of Transportation began, in the late 1980ies, to 
track the major carriers’ performance in the three categories (on-time-performance, mis-
handled baggage, and customer complaints per 100,000 passengers boarded). With 
these statistics having been published ever since on a monthly and yearly basis, SWA 
came out as the best carrier of the year in all three categories for the five straight years 
between 1992-1996.44 Although no official trophy was awarded by the Department of 
                                                 
42  For a survey of all pertinent recognitions SWA has received in its corporate history see South-
west Airlines (2002b). 
43  For details see Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 36ff). Several of the ancient and more recent print ads 
and TV commercials are on display at SWA’s homepage (http://www.southwest.com). 
44  See Southwest Airlines (1997: 16). 
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Transportation, of course, SWA quickly created a virtual ‘Triple crown’ trophy for its 
advertising purposes.  
Finally, SWA was the first airline in the world to apply special paint schemes on a few 
of its aircraft, partly in honour of states it served (Arizona, Nevada), partly for use as 
flying advertisements for tourist attractions (e.g. Sea World) at key destinations, and 
some as a tribute to its own staff (the ‘Triple Crown One’, for achieving that feat five 
times in a row45), generating additional media attention. 
Conservative Corporate Finance 
In stark contrast to the other major US airlines, SWA has always pursued a very conser-
vative approach to corporate finance, by primarily relying on internally generated funds 
for its investments needs instead of taking on too much external debt. Not only has this 
approach resulted in SWA obtaining and maintaining the industry’s best credit rating, 
thereby reducing its costs of finance. What is more, this self-imposed restriction also 
shored up the company’s conservative growth strategy, shielding it effectively from the 
potentially desastrous consequences of excessive debt-financed expansion that turned 
out to be a key factor in many of its less prudent competitors’ decline or even demise. 
Organic Corporate Growth 
SWA has, from its inception, considered ground transportation to be its main competi-
tor, and therefore tried to win over customer through low-fare, high-frequency short-
haul service. The clear focus on this specific market niche that SWA has essentially 
kept until today also explains why the airline, before spreading its wings further, it has 
always opted to deploy newly acquired aircraft to beef up frequencies on existing city-
pairs before expanding into new markets. As a result, SWA has on average added a 
mere two new destinations to its network every year since 1971 – offering high-frequen-
cies from the very start –, although, in 2001, more than 165 cities had requested SWA to 
serve them.46 Moreover, SWA has never expanded by withdrawing resources from its 
Texas home market (or other established markets) to employ them in other regions, the-
reby preserving a strong and very profitable home base and keeping customers loyal. 
Basically sticking with its short-haul niche, SWA also expanded rapidly into specific 
geographical regions – once it had decided to serve them. Throughout its history it very 
cautiously added one region after another to its network, in roughly the following se-
quence: Texas’ neighboring states, Midwest, Southwest, California, Pacific Northwest, 
Florida, and, from the mid-1990ies, the Northeast.47 
Finally, aside from the 1993 takeover of Morris Air, a small low-cost outfit based in 
Salt Lake City, operating a homogenous fleet of 21 B737 aircraft at that time on a com-
plementary, not overlapping network in the US northwest, SWA has only grown 
internally. It was thus able to avoid the manifold pitfalls inevitably associated with the 
ensuing need to harmonize vastly different corporate cultures, seniority schemes, pay 
scales etc. As the fate of many its less prudent competitors, such as USAirways, 
Northwest and the late Texas Air, proves, SWA’s conservative approach to corporate 
growth may have shielded it from permanently tense labor relations and ‘imperial and 
                                                 
45  The names of all SWA employees were painted on this plane. See Southwest Airlines (2000: 10). 
46  See Southwest Airlines (2002b). 
47  See Southwest Airlines (2000: 14f). 
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managerial overstretch’, and clearly help it sustain its very healthy financial position 
and its competitiveness. 
To summarize, SWA’s specific business model immunized the carrier far better than its 
much more vulnerable competitors from the recurrent crises of the airline industry, let-
ting it emerge ever stronger after each downturn. As a matter of fact, SWA expanded 
very strongly both during and immediately after the recession years 1980-82 and 1993-
94, adding a total of 10 new destinations in each of these periods.48  
What is more, some exogenous factors have fuelled SWA’s and the entire low-cost 
segment’s spectacular growth worldwide, while at the same time brutally exposing a 
structural weakness of the traditional network carriers’ business model: their dangerous 
overdependence on passengers willing and able to pay an ever increasing premium for 
their service.49 This once extremely profitable market segment has, however, dramati-
cally shrunk in size in recent years in the US (and is elsewhere showing clear signs of 
saturation, too). In particular this is the result of three interdependent developments: 
 widespread corporate downsizing – which is, in the light of tighter travel budgets, 
rendering business travellers’ demand for airline service increasingly price-sen-
sitive; 
 the substantial price hikes for full-fare tickets the network carriers regularly imposed 
upon their most loyal customers – only to use the additional proceeds thereof to sub-
stantially expand, and finance through internal cross-subsidization, their own low-
fare offerings to counter the onslaught of low-cost carriers in many of their core 
markets;50 and 
 the phenomenal boom of fractional ownership (i.e. a company’s right to use a corpo-
rate aircraft jointly owned by a number of enterprises for a pre-determined number 
of flight hours a year).51 
 
The ’Southwest‘-Effect: Recent Empirical Evidence 
Still widely perceived to be a regional phenomenon and a mere niche player, a quantité 
négligeable, by the end of the 1980ies, SWA is now being credited with being the single 
most important competitive force in the US airlines industry, with its increasing market 
penetration being widely perceived to be the principal source of the significant savings 
and service improvements consumers have benefitted from in the post-deregulation era. 
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of this so-called ’Southwest Effect‘ has be-
come the object of intense economic research recently. 
                                                 
48  See Southwest Airlines (2000: 14f). 
49  Martin, for example, argues that many traditional airlines still cling to the obsolete and dan-
gerous notion of air travel being an élite form of travel instead of a mass market. See Martin 
(2002: 13). 
50  See Petzinger (1995: 460). 
51  The underlying reasons behind the fractional ownership boom are the, compared to airline travel, 
greatly increased flexibility and comfort, significant time-savings (at airports) as well as the per-
ceived higher security level (an important post-9/11-effect). For a survey of fractional ownership 
growth trends and a detailed discussion of its advantage and disadvantages see aerokurier-online 
(1999), Andersen (2001). 
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SWA’s Impact on Fares and Passenger Volumes 
The literature we reviewed offers several distinct definitions of the ’Southwest effect‘ 
and alternative methodologies to quantify it. All these differences apart, there is wide-
spread consensus that SWA has been the single most important stimulus of competition 
in the post-deregulation US airline industry and that its impact has been growing 
substantially since the early 1990ies, in parallel with the carriers‘ ongoing network ex-
pansion to cover an ever larger portion of the nation’s prime aviation markets. 
Initially the term ‘Southwest effect’ was used to describe the positive change in the 
number of enplanements plus the induced decrease of the average fare at the airports 
and/or on the specific markets SWA had entered.52 In a 1996 study, the United States 
Department of Transportation identified three distinct facets of the ‘Southwest effect’ 
without, however, trying to quantify them or assess their importance relative to each 
other:  
                                                
 The direct competitive effect – lower fares, higher passenger volumes – on the 
specific city-pair market, SWA has chosen to enter. 
 The so-called ’halo‘-effect with SWA’s entry lowering fares at nearby airports. 
 The role model-effect with SWA’s successful business formula serving as a 
blueprint for newcomers, whose entry in other markets, in turn, has intensified 
competition there. 53 
 
Vowles, in two recent studies, found, using regression analysis, a statistically significant 
effect of low-cost carriers (including SWA) on fare levels also at most neighboring 
airports54 and of SWA’s presence at one airport in multi-airport regions on fares in the  
affected area as a whole.55 The latter paper includes 9 case studies revealing very intere-
sting fare and enplanement trends. According to his calculations, after one year of serv-
ice, SWA’s entry had on average lowered fares on the 13 city-pairs to or from these 
multi-airport regions it served and for which his study contains data by 47 per cent (out-
liers: –11 per cent; –82 per cent), while passenger numbers increased by a mean of 
2,064 per cent (outliers: +71 per cent; +7,025 (!) per cent).56 
 
 
52  See Windle/Dresner (1995); Southwest Airlines (2000);  
53  See United States Department of Transportation (1996: 5 and 11). – In 1993 the U.S. DOT had 
already commissioned a report on SWA’s procompetitive impact in the regions it had served at 
that time. See Bennett/Craun (1993). 
54  See Vowles (2000). 
55  See Vowles (2001). 
56  Of course, passenger volumes exploded on routes with no non-stop air service before SWA’s 
entry whereas its effect both on fare levels and enplanements was generally lower in markets 
already served by other low-fare airlines or, like Florida, characterized by a high percentage of 
price-sensitive leisure travellers. Amazingly enough, however, network carriers had provided air 
service between most of these city-pairs (although to and/or from different airfields) and/or regi-
ons before SWA’s entry. 
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The most comprehensive and ambitious attempt so far to define and quantify the 
‘Southwest effect’, is Morrison‘s 2001 study.57 Through disaggregation he distinguishes 
three different types of SWA’s competitive impact: 
 Actual competition: SWA is a direct competitor on the route, with, as a result, both 
SWA’s and the incumbents‘ passengers profiting from lower average fares. 
 Adjacent competition: SWA operates on an adjacent route a significant proportion 
of consumers consider a good substitute for the incumbent’s offering. 
 Potential competition: this includes incumbents‘ fare reductions to deter SWA – al-
ready present at the airport in question or at a nearby facility – from entering new 
routes which would put the two carriers into actual or adjacent competition. 
 
Using a simulation model, he estimates that, for entering new markets by undercutting 
incumbents by an average of 46.2 per cent,58 SWA lower average fares translate into 
overall savings to US airline passengers of $ 3.4 bn per year (figure for 1998). Further, 
he estimates the savings for consumers through the effects of other carriers lowering 
their fares in reaction to SWA’s actual, adjacent, and potential competition at another $ 
9.5 bn yearly – a grand total of $12.9 bn or around 20 per cent of the entire industry’s 
1998 annual revenues and slightly more than half of all fare savings having accrued to 
passengers after and because of airline deregulation.59 Finally, he reckons that SWA is 
by now able to directly influence fares, as an actual and adjacent competitor, on 44.8 per 
cent of the domestic US market in terms of passenger miles flown. In addition to that, 
he ascribes to SWA a similar influence, as a potential competitor, on another 49.4 per 
cent of the market – in sum an amazing 94 per cent of the total.60 
Most interesting, however, is Morrison’s finding that some key routes between major 
US airports,61 among them a number of network carriers‘ hubs, are (still?) beyond 
SWA’s reach. As we will argue below, this is due to the persistence of severe barriers to 
entry at some of these key markets. While SWA has in the mean time – the study is 
based upon 1998 data – entered three of them (Buffalo, Hartford, and Raleigh-Durham) 
and started to provide some adjacent competition to New York LaGuardia (a slot-cons-
trained field) and Newark (a prime Continental hub) through its new service to Islip 
near New York City,62 these airports are: 
 Atlanta (the principal Delta hub, with Delta facing some low-fare competition 
through Air Tran, however),  
 Charlotte (a USAirways hub),  
 Memphis and Minneapolis/St. Paul (both major Northwest hubs),  
                                                 
57  See Morrison (2001). – It is partly based upon research presented before the US Senate in 1998 
already. See Morrison (1998). 
58  See ibd., p. 250. 
59  See ibd., p. 239. 
60  See ibd., p. 243. 
61  See ibd., p. 243 (footnote 6). 
62  In addition, rapidly expanding JetBlue has offered low-fare service from its base at New York’s 
Kennedy Airport from 2000. 
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 Richmond, 
 Philadelphia and Pittsburgh (the two principal USAirways hubs).  
 
SWA’s Impact on Air Service Quality 
As shown in the preceding section, all studies on the ’Southwest effect‘ exclusively 
focus on SWA‘s impact on fare levels and passenger volumes. We therefore suggest to 
add another component to the ‘Southwest effect‘ for a more complete picture – service 
quality as measured in the United States Department of Transportation’s Air Travel 
Consumer Reports.63 Since these statistics were published for the first time in 1987, 
SWA has, as mentioned above, consistently performed extremely well in all three ca-
tegories: mishandled baggage, on-time performance, and overall customer satisfaction 
(number of complaints per 100,000 passengers), especially in the period from 1992-
1996. 
While still coming out regularly on top in overall customer satisfaction, some network 
carriers have more recently beaten SWA in the two other categories. More important, 
however, is the fact, that these statistics witness a steady decrease of the spread between 
individual carriers service standards – at generally higher levels of service quality. What 
is more, while SWA’s product quality has remained constantly good over time, its 
unique combination of low-cost, low-fare and high-quality service made public by the 
Department of Transportation statistics has obviously forced the much more expensive 
network carriers to significantly clean up their act and improve their own performance. 
 
Southwest’s Strategies to Overcome Entry Barriers 
Barriers to entry into an industry are generally defined as cost advantages incumbents 
enjoy over newcomers due to the fact that the former are already present in the markets 
the latter wish to serve.64 As for the post-deregulation airline industry, it is widely held 
that effective barriers to entry may exist only due to infrastructure bottlenecks and as a 
result of strategic behavior by established carriers (in practice the distinction between 
both types of entry barriers may be much less clear-cut, since some infrastructure bottle-
necks only exist due to strategic hoarding by incumbents).65 We will discuss in this 
chapter how SWA managed to cope with these specific barriers to entry, and more im-
portantly, were it failed to do so, and for what reasons. As SWA was founded in the pre-
deregulation period, however, when some types of legal barriers to entry were a signifi-
cant impediment even to intrastate airline competition also in fairly liberal Texas, 
SWA’s home state, we will also discuss their impact on SWA. 
 
                                                 
63  The most recent issues of the Air Travel Consumer Report are available for download at the 
United States Department of Transportation’s homepage (http://www.dot.gov/airconsumer). 
64  For a general discussion on the economics of entry barriers see the seminal work by Bain (1956). 
65  For an overview see Transportation Research Board (1991: 134ff); Knorr (1998: 448f); 
Kummer/Schnell (2001). 
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Barriers to Entry in the Airline Industry 
Legal Barriers 
Potentially, there are four different types of legal entry barriers in the airline industry: 
ownership rules, operating licences, route-specific traffic rights, and perimeter rules at 
airports. While ownership restrictions still play an important role in international avia-
tion policy66 the have never been relevant for SWA, as a US carrier offering domestic 
services only. What is more, to be allowed to set up an airline, all countries require a 
formal operating licence be granted by their civil aviation authorities. This requirement, 
however, did not stand in the way of SWA’s entry either. We will therefore not continue 
to discuss these issues. 
Aside from still being extremely important barriers to entry into cross-border airline 
services, the requirement to obtain route-specific traffic rights was also the single most 
important impediment to domestic airline competition on the US market before deregu-
lation.67 They were issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) for all intrastate ser-
vices and by its state counterparts – such as the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC) 
or the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) – for all purely intrastate 
services. Newcomers, however, had to produce with their application for route authority 
credible evidence that their proposed service was necessary to meet pent-up demand so 
far neglected by the incumbent carrier(s), with the latter being in the position, however, 
to take, for strategic reasons, legal action against the decision by the authorities to grant 
any newcomer this so-called certificate of necessity and convenience. As for interstate 
services, the CAB refused to certificate68 any new trunk carriers – i.e. a new competitor 
in the category of the major airlines such as American, Delta, Northwest, Continental, 
United, (late) Eastern etc. – aside from the 16 airlines which had obtained theirs as early 
as 1938, the year the CAB was established. In the 1950ies, after the majors had begun to 
withdraw from a significant number of short-distance city-pairs or to substantially re-
duce frequencies there, it reacted by creating a new airline category to fill this gap: ’lo-
cal carriers‘, such as Alaska Airlines, Allegheny Airlines, Ozark Air Lines or Piedmont 
Airlines. In addition, ’Commuter airlines‘ and ’Supplemental Carriers‘ were certificated 
for non-scheduled air taxi and package tour-services respectively. With the exception of 
only three states – Texas, California, and Florida – state authorities were as restrictive as 
the CAB in granting intrastate route. 
Even after deregulation so-called perimeter rules restrict entry to some important US 
airports – Washington National, New York LaGuardia, and Dallas Love Field – by for-
bidding revenue services either to destinations beyond a certain geographical distance69 
                                                 
66  See for example Knorr/Arndt (2002). 
67  For details see Biedermann (1982) and Bailey/Graham/Kaplan (1985). 
68 NB: Legally speaking, only the CAB was allowed to certificate an airline. In other words, all in-
trastate airlines permitted to operate within their home states boundaries by their respective state 
authorities, including SWA, did not have nor require the status of a (CAB-)certificated carrier. 
As we will discuss below, this distinction turned out to be of vital importance for SWA’s suc-
cessful implementation of its business model in the start-up phase.   
69  The thresholds for incoming and outgoing flights are 1,500 miles at LaGuardia and 1,250 miles 
at Washington National. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1996: 13). – Only recently have 
flights to/from Denver been exempted from the perimeter rule in force at LaGuardia. See Trans-
portation Research Board (1999: 3-5). 
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or, in the case of Dallas Love Field, by permitting commercial flights to/from airfields 
in specific US states only.70 
 
Infrastructure Bottlenecks 
The absence of legal barriers to entry is only one prerequisite for free, undistorted com-
petition. At an increasing number of major airports, infrastructure bottlenecks – often 
the result of a command-and-control approach to infrastructure allocation and/or stra-
tegic behavior of incumbents which are in the legal position to control access to these 
facilities – stand in the way of new entrants. Basically, there are two sources of 
potentially anticompetitive infrastructure-related entry barriers:  
 The lack of slots (at desirable times) due to insufficient runway capacity or strategic 
hoarding of available slots by incumbents,71 or 
 the lack of access to vital ground facilities such as gates. This shortage may either be 
due to long-term exclusive use leases between airport operators and incumbent airli-
nes – frequently granted by US airport operators in return for these carriers‘ willing-
ness to shoulder a substantial share of the financial burden of these airports‘ expan-
sion – or the bundling of facility access and specific ancilliary services (such as 
ground-handling or maintenance) as a precondition imposed by the incumbent for 
entering into a subleasing agreement with a newcomer.72 
 
Strategic Barriers to Entry 
Aside from the strategic (ab)use of infrastructure bottlenecks or the legal process, aca-
demic and non-academic research has identified a number of strategic barriers to entry 
into the airline industry.73 In particular these are  
 the incumbents‘ strategic use of the most important distribution channels (i.e. com-
puter reservation systems CRS which may be subject to a display bias in favor of the 
incumbent)74 and travel agencies (whose loyalty the incumbents may reward through 
higher commissions and overrides); 
 loyalty schemes for passengers (frequent flyer programs); and 
 (the threat of) price and non-price predatory action against newcomers. 
 
                                                 
70  See below at subchapter 3.2.1. 
71  For a detailed discussion of US slot allocation procedures see Langner (1995). 
72  For details see FAA/OST Task Force (1999); U.S. General Accounting Office (1996: 13). 
73  See for many Levine (1987); Weinhold (1995); United States General Accounting Office (1996); 
United States Department of Transportation (1999); Meyer/Menzies (2000). 
74  In the US, all CRS are operated by major airlines: SABRE by American, APOLLO by United, 
WORLDSPAN by Delta and SYSTEM ONE by Continental, to mention just the most important 
ones. 
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Other Barriers to Entry 
Other barriers to entry include on the one hand the need for newcomers to overcome 
their potential customers‘ lack of brand and product awareness through advertising. On 
the other hand, the flying public may be reluctant to use low-cost airlines for fear of 
perceived lower safety standards as compared to the major carriers. For example, many 
other no-frills carriers suffered cancellations, a significantly lower number of new book-
ings, and substantial decline of their share prices after the fatal May 1996 crash near 
Miami of a DC-9 operated by the low-cost airline ValuJet (which, in turn, even went out 
of business as a result).75 By contrast, established full-service carriers with well-known 
brands like USAirways (with a series of five deadly crashes between 1991 and 1995) 
did not see their business being seriously affected by accidents. 
 
How Did SWA Overcome These Entry Barriers – and Where Did It Fail? 
Legal Entry Barriers 
In its start-up phase SWA faced a series of legal hurdles in three areas – route authority, 
airport selection, and perimeter rules –, more often than not erected by incumbent car-
riers trying to prevent their new competitor from getting off the ground.76  
Route Authority 
Having filed the documents to incorporate the airline on March 15, 1967, and having 
obtained the operating licence soon after, SWA applied for traffic rights between three 
Texas cities – Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio – with the TAC on November 27, 
1967. They were granted on February 20, 1968. On February 21, 1968, however, local 
incumbents Braniff, Trans Texas (later to become Texas International), and Continental 
obtained a temporary restraining order from the courts on the grounds that the markets 
SWA wanted to serve were already saturated. After lengthy legal proceedings – which 
ended in late 1970 (!) when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, after the 
Texas Supreme Court had been the first court to rule in SWA’s favor – SWA came out 
the winner. Braniff and Trans Texas, however, (unsuccessfully77) filed another com-
plaint, this time with the CAB, the body regulating interstate airline services only, to 
prevent SWA from finally taking off. They imaginatively argued that SWA was not an 
intrastate carrier, and hence outside the TAC’s legislation, since some of SWA’s pas-
sengers might connect with other (CAB-certificated) carriers to travel on to destinations 
outside Texas. Finally, two days before SWA’s scheduled first flight on June 18, 1971, 
the two carriers had obtained another restraining order from a lower Texas court, argu-
ing that SWA’s had deviated from the original operating plan the TAC had approved. 
On June 17, 1971, the Texas Supreme Court, however, ordered that restraining order to 
be dissolved, too. 
                                                 
75 In the meantime ValuJet took over Air Tran, under whose brand name it has operated ever since. 
76  See Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 15ff) and Petzinger (1995: 27ff) for a more detailed history of 
SWA’s start-up phase. 
77  After the CAB had refused to follow the two carriers‘ line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals in 
the District of Columbia also rejected the plea. See Petzinger (1995: 29). 
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The main effect of the legal controversies on SWA was that the company only narrowly 
escaped bankruptcy in their course. Not only did they deprive SWA of commercial re-
venues for almost four years. More important still, the legal expenses it had to incur had 
more than depleted SWA’s financial assets ($ 543,000 at the date of its incorporation); 
in January 1971, with only $ 142 (!) left in the bank, SWA had accumulated liabilities 
of around $ 80,00078 – unsurprisingly so, since SWA, given the uncertain outcome of 
the trials, had been unable to attract any new investors before the U.S. Supreme Courts‘ 
final decision.  
Airport Selection and Perimeter Rules 
In June 1972, a suit was filed against SWA by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth as 
well as the Regional Airport Board for its refusal to move its operations from Dallas 
Love Field to the new Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport (DFW). The construction of 
the new airfield had primarily been financed by municipal bonds which contained the 
provision that all ‘certificated’ carriers serving Love Field would instead have to use the 
new facilities after its completion. SWA, having moved its Houston operation from 
remote Houston Intercontinental airport to Hobby Field in downtown Houston in late 
November 1971 – and experiencing a spectacular boost in load factors as a result, ren-
dering the route SWA‘s first big moneymaker – successfully argued before the courts 
that the provision in question exclusively referred to (CAB-)certificated (interstate) car-
riers, but not to intrastate operations under TAC jurisdiction like its own.79  
After deregulation took effect in 1978, SWA immediately applied for interstate route 
authority – to New Orleans –, only to run into the opposition of former DFW supporters 
again, among them Fort Worth congressman Jim Wright. Though incompatible with the 
spirit of the Airline Deregulation Act 1978, he managed to persuade a majority of the 
U.S. Congress to support his so-called Wright Amendment of 1979. This piece of legis-
lation, which, slightly modified by the Shelby Amendment, is still in effect today, al-
though it was recently held to be illegal by the U.S. Department of Transportation,80 
bans any airline from offering any nonstop or through-plane interstate revenue service 
out of Dallas Love Field except to airports in the four neighboring states of Texas: Ar-
kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma; the Shelby Amendment later added the 
states of Mississippi and Alabama. While being a negligeable impediment to SWA’s ex-
pansion and competitiveness during its first three decades of operation, it has prevented 
the airline so far from expanding into the long-haul market81 from its Dallas base, 
thereby putting it at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis its DFW-based competitors in its very 
home market. 
 
                                                 
78  See Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 19). 
79  See Petzinger (1995: 31). 
80  See FAA/OST (1999: 24). – In late 1998 the U.S. Department of Transportation issued an order 
allowing airlines to serve any US city out of Dallas Love Field provided aircraft capacity does 
not exceed 56 seats. A complaint against this ruling filed by American Airlines is still pending. 
For details see American Bar Association (2000: 7). 
81  Aside from the aforementioned long-haul services from the East Coast to Phoenix, SWA has re-
cently introduced transcontinental services from Chicago Midway to several airfields in Califor-
nia. See Southwest Airlines (2002d). 
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Infrastructure Bottlenecks 
Quick turnaround times, a high average daily fleet utilization and high frequency ser-
vice on its routes being three key ingredients of SWA’s outstanding overall productivi-
ty, the carrier de rigueur had to concentrate its operation on secondary and uncongested 
airports. Given the abundance of underutilized airfields in all major US population cen-
ters, scarcity of slots, as of now, has never been an important entry barrier for the airline 
or an impediment to its expansion into any geographical area. 
A different picture, however, emerges with respect to ground infrastructure bottlenecks, 
i.e. gate-constraint airports, some of which SWA had in vain tried to enter. Northwest‘s 
Minneapolis hub is a case in point. At this airport, all 70 gates have been leased to 
incumbents under exclusive use agreements, 54 of them to Northwest. While 32 of these 
70 gate leases, beginning in 1999, have been subject to gradual conversion from 
exclusive use to preferential use (by their current exclusive lessee), the first 22 leases of 
the remaining 38 gate will expire only in 2015.82 All carriers wishing to serve this 
airport – newcomers as well as incumbents wanting to increase their market presence – 
will therefore have to conclude a sublease agreement with Northwest or any other 
incumbent (i.e. more often than not with Northwest). In order to obtain the gates SWA 
needed to commence service to Minneapolis, Northwest insisted in its proposed 
sublease agreement that SWA use Northwest‘s staff only for all ground-handling 
services.83 As, given Northwest’s staff lower productivity and the obvious conflicting 
loyalties this arrangement would have inevitably produced, that condition would have 
put SWA at a clear competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Northwest, SWA decided not to 
enter the Minneapolis market (and most other gate-constrained airports as well) until 
today.  
 
Strategic Entry Barriers 
Above we identified three possible strategic barriers incumbents might use to deter 
newcomers from entering the industry and/or specific markets: control of the main dis-
tribution channels, loyalty schemes for passengers and (the threat of) predatory action. 
Distribution Channels 
The increasing number of internet bookings notwithstanding, airlines have traditionally 
relied on the intermediation of travel agencies to distribute the bulk – around 80 to 90 
per cent84 – of their tickets. Travel agencies, in turn, usually subscribe to one of the 
airline-operated CRS for flight and fare information and for automated booking. While 
the (airline) operators earn a fee from the airlines for every reservation made on their 
system, airlines also pay a commission to travel agencies for every booked flight. Apart 
from standard commissions, most airlines offer so-called override commissions as a 
special incentive to those travel agencies which generate a high (pre-set) volume of 
annual revenues for the carrier in question. Ticket distribution costs, including 
                                                 
82  See U.S. General Accounting Office (1999: 17). 
83  See U.S. General Accounting Office (1996: 13). 
84  See Grant (1996: 179); Bouvard/Somosi (1997: 173). 
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overrides, via travel agencies hence typically range between 17 to 25 per cent of the 
ticket price.85 
While the commercial importance of non-discriminatory access to CRS and travel agen-
cies should not be underestimated, SWA proved that these distribution channels are not 
as relevant for an airline’s survival as previously thought. In May 1994, both United‘s 
APOLLO and Continental’s SYSTEM ONE, after setting up their own low-cost subsi-
diaries (Shuttle by United and Continental Lite) to directly compete with SWA, disabled 
the highly important automated ticketing function for all SWA flights.86 What is more, 
Delta downgraded SWA on its WORLDSPAN CRS after the airline had entered Delta’s 
Salt Lake City hub following its acquisition of Morris Air. Although already selling a 
significant portion of its tickets at that time (around 45 per cent) directly, it is obvious 
that SWA had to react to this ouster with a comprehensive strategy to diversify its distri-
bution channels in order to remain in business:87 
 As an interim solution, SWA created a simplified CRS of its own – SWAT (South-
west Airlines Air Travel), for direct access and ticketing –, connecting its fifty high-
est-volume travel agencies to the new system. 
 Guaranteed overnight ticket delivery was introduced for the around 300 next largest 
travel agencies doing business with SWA. 
 The Ticket-by-Mail-service for direct customers who had booked at one of SWA’s 
phone reservation centers was sped up to a guaranteed three-day delivery. 
 A new phone reservation center was opened at Little Rock. 
 Systemwide ticketless travel was introduced on January 31, 1995; in addition, SWA 
became the first US airline to offer (ticketless) on-line booking on its homepage. 
 As of May 1, 1995, it negotiated a no-frills access, called BASIC SABRE, to Amer-
ican’s SABRE CRS for travel agencies and direct customers (American had long 
pursued a strategy of coexistence with SWA in their joint Dallas home market, fo-
cussing on flow traffic, i.e. on connecting medium- to long-haul and premium pas-
sengers, and leaving the short-haul market largely to SWA).88 
 
Through this plethora of defensive actions SWA not only significantly reduced its de-
pendence on its principal competitors‘ CRS. Much more important, it also managed to 
substantially lower its own distribution costs by innovations the competition has still 
found unable to fully harness, thereby strengthening its cost leadership position even 
more.89 
                                                 
85  See Bouvard/Somosi (1997: 173); Pappas (2001: 50). 
86  See Southwest Airlines (1995: 13); Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 136). 
87  See Southwest Airlines (1995: 6, 13 and 19). 
88  See Bartkin/Hertzell/Young (1995: 86). – In 1993, when SWA had decided to enter California, 
American immediately scaled down its local short-haul operation to avoid a direct confrontation 
with SWA. See Petzinger (1996: 458). 
89  Generally speaking, direct selling of tickets by the airline instead of using intermediaries cuts 
distribution costs by half. Direct selling by the carrier on the internet reduces these costs by at 
least around another 50 per cent. See Pappas (2001: 50). 
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By contrast, SWA cited Northwest’s override policy as the decisive factor in its decisi-
on to withdraw from the Detroit-Indianapolis market in the mid-1990ies – one of the 
extremely rare cases it ever withdrew service –, after local travel agencies‘ booking pat-
terns had substantially shifted in Northwest’s favor as a result.90 Although this was the 
only known such incident, it cannot be ruled out, given SWA’s (and other low-cost 
carriers‘) conspicuous absence from two of Northwest’s three main hubs – Minneapolis 
and Memphis – and its relatively small presence at Northwest’s third hub in Detroit – 
that the combination of an aggressive override policy and Northwest’s dominance of ga-
tes at its hub airports has proved to be an insurmountable barrier even for SWA.91, 92 
Loyalty Schemes 
Frequent flyer programs are generally considered to be the powerful marketing tool to 
boost passenger loyalty by rewarding frequent travellers not only with ’free travel‘ – 
although actually those awards do not come free for the recipient but simply form 
another type of discount – and other amenities such as lounge access, waiting-list priori-
ty, preferred check-in etc. Usually, full-fare tickets earn their holders a multiple of the 
mileage available in return for flying on discount fares (with some discount fares being 
not eligible at all for mileage accrual). What is more, airline try to steer bookings to 
specific flights by offering their loyalty program members bonus miles on top of the 
regular mileage. As a result, all those passengers who do not have to pay for their own 
travel but who are in the position to redeem their frequent flyer awards for private 
purposes – i.e. most passengers travelling on a corporate budget –, do not have the 
incentive to use, all other things being equal, the least expensive airline. Instead they 
will choose the fare/airline that will earn them the maximum mileage possible for any 
given itinerary – and will therefore not normally travel on a low-cost low-fare carrier 
even though this would mean significant savings for their companies. In order to solve 
this principal-agent problem, more and more corporations, however, demand that their 
employees surrender all frequent flyer benefits earned on business trips or to use the 
lowest fare available. Finally, award tickets privately used by employees that result 
from travel paid for by the companies, are now widely considered to be a specific form 
of non-wage income – subject to income tax. 
Even for the airlines, frequent flyer programs are a two-edged sword. While indeed in-
creasing passenger loyalty, they are a very expensive marketing tool. Aside from sub-
stantial administration costs, airlines incur huge (opportunity) costs for on average hav-
ing to reserve around 10 per cent of their capacity for passengers wishing to redeem 
their mileage for ’free‘ flights. In addition to the aforementioned developments, the loy-
alty schemes‘ attractiveness and hence their anticompetitive potential has further declin-
ed because of 
 the introduction of ever more restrictions for the use of ’free‘ award tickets, such as 
stricter blackout dates during periods of peak demand (holidays, special events etc) 
                                                 
90  See U.S. General Accounting Office (1996: 16). 
91  This might also in part explain Morrision’s findings that some major US airports still lack low-
fare service. See Morrison (2001: 243). 
92  Before the new exclusive Northwest terminal at Detroit airport was opened in early 2002, North-
west used 56 of the 81 jet gates available there under an exclusive use lease arrangement, aside 
from regularly using another 6 gates. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1999: 19). 
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– when travel on award tickets is disallowed or these are issued only if a substantial-
ly higher amount of mileage credit is surrendered by the passenger; 
 the need to book award travel well in advance, due to the above-mentioned restricti-
ons and, given their still increasing popularity in terms of membership figures, the 
ever fiercer competition among frequent travellers themselves for the limited numb-
er of ’free‘ seats on every flight; and 
 the decision by most US carriers to honor accumulated mileage for good93 (before, 
unused mileage credit would typically expire after an average of three years). This, 
in turn, relieves passengers from the need to earn as many miles as fast as possible 
on the airline in question (and its program partners) to obtain the award they desire.  
 
While SWA, as mentioned above, did create, in 1987, a frequent flyer program of its 
own – now known as Rapid Rewards –, its operation is vastly different from industry 
standards in some crucial aspects, as well as for its simplicity.94 Most importantly, 
award tickets do not require the accrual of a specific pre-determined amount of mileage 
but a minimum number of trips flown per year – à la buy eight (round trips), get one 
(round trip) free. What is more, aside from defining only a very small number of black-
out dates, the company does not set aside capacity for award travellers. Instead it alloca-
tes all available seats on a first come, first served basis, i.e. it does not discriminate be-
tween award travellers and revenue passengers in the booking process. In sum, these 
features allow SWA to offer its most loyal customers all the benefits of a full-fledged 
frequent flyer scheme – with, for SWA being a purely domestic airline, the exception of 
international award travel – in a much more cost-effective manner in comparison to its 
competitors. 
(Threat of) Predatory Action 
Predation is defined as an incumbent‘s attempts to drive more efficient actual competi-
tors out of the market, or to coerce them into accepting the incumbent’s price leader-
ship, or to deter potential competitors from entry, either by temporarily charging consu-
mers prices below (variable) costs (’predatory pricing‘) or by artificially raising rivals‘ 
costs, with the objective of defending or conquering a dominant position – and the mo-
nopoly profits associated with it – on the market in question. In other words, if the pre-
dator prevails, this outcome is not the result of its superior efficiency but of its ability to 
abuse its market power – with, in the end, detrimental consequences for consumers who 
will have to bear all the negative effects of the ensuing monopoly. While some econo-
mic schools of thought, most notably the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, dismiss 
predation as an irrational strategy for any company to pursue, more recent research, ba-
sed on game theory and the theory of industrial organization, has clearly demonstrated 
that predatory pricing may indeed be a viable option for incumbents,95 if  
 the market in question is characterized by substantial barriers to entry, and 
                                                 
93  Some airlines require their passengers to accumulate mileage at least once in three years lest they 
lose their credit after this period. 
94  See Southwest Airlines (2002e). 
95  See, for example, Ordover/Saloner (1989), Milgrom/Robert (1990), Roth (1995) and Lott (1999) 
for a detailed discussion of the economics of predation. 
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 recoupment of the losses incurred due to temporary predatory pricing is possible 
(either by later charging monopoly prices or by overcharging consumers on other 
markets the incumbent also serves and where it does not face effective competition 
(so-called multi-market recoupment)). 
 
The allegedly increasing number of incidents of predatory behavior in the US airline 
industry has not only become the object of scholarly research recently.96 It has also 
prompted the United States Department of Transportation to draft, based upon in a 1998 
white paper (revised in 1999)97 an “enforcement policy regarding unfair exclusionary 
conduct in the air transportation industry“98 so as to protect start-up airlines against un-
fair competitive practices by incumbents. Also, the Department of Justice filed an anti-
trust complaint against AA – unsuccessfully so, for failure to convincingly prove its ac-
cusations.99  
While predatory behavior is notoriously hard to prove (for lack of comprehensive cost 
and fare data of both airlines involved, for the intricacies of the diverse cost and recoup-
ment tests, and for the tremendous difficulty of proving predatory intent), SWA’s own 
history offers some very interesting lessons, both with regard to possible types of preda-
tion in the airline business and how to counter them.  
While only narrowly surviving price and non-price predation attempts by incumbents in 
its start-up phase, SWA, however, unlike many other smaller low-cost carriers has not 
been the object of such practices for many years. This is because incumbents learned 
from experience that, as a result of SWA’s specific business model, predatory action 
against the carrier would normally fail – and prove extremely costly for them. SWA’s 
reputation as being rather immune to predation rests upon the following pillars:100 
 Historical precedent: In February 1973, incumbent Braniff attacked SWA by cutting 
its one-way fare between Dallas and Houston – then SWA’s only profitable market 
– by 50 per cent to $ 13. Aside from playing the David-vs-Goliath card in its adver-
tising and in the media, SWA reacted by offering its passenger a choice of two fares: 
$ 13 with the standard no-frills service, or $ 26 including a free bottle of liquor (that 
did not have to be consumed on board). Initially, 76 per cent of all passengers, most 
of them businesspeople travelling on expenses, choose the latter option, temporarily 
rendering SWA the biggest distributor of spirits in Texas.101  
 Having evolved into the most consistently profitable US airline as well as the in-
dustry’s undisputed cost leader, SWA, in the meantime, has the resources to sustain 
a price war for an even longer period than the established network carriers (as de-
monstrated by SWA’s success in fending off even their low-cost subsidiaries). 
                                                 
96  See Morrison/Winston (2000: 7ff); Oster/Strong (2001). 
97  See United States Department of Transportation (1998 and 1999). 
98  See United States Department of Transportation (2001). 
99  All pertinent legal documents are available at Americans’s (http://www.aadoj.com) and the Uni-
ted States Department of Justice’s homepages (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/indx199.htm). 
100  See U.S. Department of Transportation (2001: 29); Oster/Strong (2001). 
101  See Southwest Airlines (1997: 10); Freiberg/Freiberg (1996: 33). 
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 Whereas many low-fare start-ups offer a small number of daily round trips only, 
SWA usually enters a new market with high-frequency service. As a result, it would 
be prohibitively costly for incumbents to apply a ’bracketing‘ strategy against SWA. 
(’Bracketing‘ means that incumbents schedule additional flights closely around the 
new entrants‘ departure times and match or even undercut its fares on just these 
flights while maintaining their normal fares on all other flights to the new entrants‘ 
destination(s)). 
 More often than not, incumbents offered connecting or throughplane service only, 
hence competing with an inferior product against SWA’s nonstop service. 
 Serving 59 airports in most parts of the USA, SWA directly or indirectly competes 
in many geographical markets with the network carriers. This multi-market contact 
would allow SWA to retaliate over a broad range of city-pairs, thus creating strong 
incentives for network carriers not to engage in predation against SWA in the first 
place. 
 
Other Barriers to Entry 
SWA’s excellent advertising, its cultivation of an underdog image until today and its 
frequent media presence – ironically in part due to TV and press coverage of its compe-
titors’ manifold legal actions against its operation –, helped the carrier to early establish 
a high media profile and a distinct brand at least in the regions it served. What is more, 
its lastingly outstanding safety record, which, on all counts, has topped the established 
network carriers’ performance, has become another important determinant of the 
carriers’ extraordinary competitiveness. 
 
Conclusions 
  
SWA’s is not the only low-cost business model in the airline industry – AirTran, for 
example, is in effect competing against Delta in Atlanta by emulating its a hub-and-
spoke model; JetBlue is operating from New York’s busy and high-cost JFK airport –, 
but so far by a wide margin the most consistently successful one. What is more, SWA 
flourished although (or rather because?) it defied “every success maxim of the post-
deregulation world”:102 the alleged need to erect strategic barriers to entry by establish-
ing a hub-and-spoke operation, by using sophisticated yield management techniques, by 
relying on CRS and travel agents as the principal distribution channels, and by creating 
passenger loyalty by means of a frequent flyer scheme. While indeed savvily adopting 
some very basic versions of these tools, as the company saw fit, it never abandoned its 
original business formula, refining it instead by adding said features to its product. In 
other words, the SWA story not only demonstrates that the effectiveness of strategic 
barriers to entry has long been overestimated by economists, airline professional, and 
policymakers alike. On the contrary, it clearly proves that infrastructure bottlenecks – 
which, in turn, are overwhelmingly caused or at least amplified by ill-designed allocati-
on rules and access regulations – must be considered the only effective barrier to entry 
in the airline industry. Not only do they shield inefficient incumbents directly from lea-
                                                 
102  Petzinger (1995: 319). 
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ner competitors. Even more important, experience has shown that established carriers 
can only erect meaningful strategic entry barriers upon this base.  
SWA’s early success on the intrastate market in Texas not only served as a blueprint for 
the Airline Deregulation Act 1978. The company has also turned out to be only lasting 
success story of the post-deregulation era in the USA. For it (and the entire ‘low cost 
service revolution’) to continue, policymakers must therefore do their utmost to ensure 
non-discriminatory infrastructure access in the future. 
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